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CITY OF EDGERTON: CREATING A FRIENDLIER
FORUM FOR INSURANCE COMPANIES
I. INTRODUCrION
In June of 1994, a summer wind swept through Wisconsin carrying
with it the sweet smell of change-sweet for insurance companies
anyway.
In that month, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided a case that
significantly changed the direction of environmental law in Wisconsin
called City of Edgerton v. General Casualty Company' The case
involved an ordinary dispute between the owners of a contaminated
landfill and their insurance company. The owners were seeking coverage
under their comprehensive general liability policy for any costs associat-
ed with the clean up of the contaminated site. From these ordinary facts
arose a particularly extraordinary result: the court ruled for the insurer,
holding that the comprehensive general liability policy did not cover any
costs associated with the clean up of the landfill.
The decision, considered an anomaly under Wisconsin law,' caused
an immediate reaction in the community. Over one hundred parties
launched an amicus campaign by submitting several motions for
reconsideration.' The parties submitting briefs included "local and
industrial/trade associations, municipal government associations or
municipalities, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources and
Department of Justice, individual Wisconsin businesses, and environmen-
tal advocacy/public interest groups."4
Why did this case produce such an enormous reaction from the legal
community? The answer is pessimistically simple: money. Environmen-
tal clean up programs are extremely expensive and could cause the
financial demise of any party shouldering the burden.' Therefore, a
large portion of environmental litigation involves sorting out the
liabilities between all the potentially responsible parties ("PRPs"),
1. 184 Wis. 2d 750, 517 N.W.2d 463 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995).
2. See Raymond R. Krueger & Cynthia E. Smith, Maximizing Insurance Recovery for
Environmental Damages After Edgerton, ENVTL. L. UPDATE (State Bar Association of
Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI), March 2-3, 1995, at 1.
3. Il (all the motions were denied).
4. Id.
5. Some sources estimate the total national cost of the all environmental cleanup
programs to be $160 billion per year. Paul L. Langer, Environmental Insurance Coverage
Issues in Illinois: Moving Toward Resolution, 82 ILL. B.J. 90 (1994).
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including the insurance companies.6 The court is left with the thankless
job of interpreting the language of the insurance policies to determine
whether the environmental claim is covered under the policy.
Environmental law is governed by the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA").7 Congress
passed CERCLA in 1980 and reauthorized the program in 1986 through
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA").' The
initial CERCLA statute came in response to many high profile cases that
highlighted the growing problem of environmental pollution and fostered
public concern in the late 1960s.'
CERCLA had an immediate effect on many industries and revolu-
tionized both the process for cleaning hazardous waste sites and the
distribution of the costs associated with a cleanup program. Prior to
CERCLA, the few environmental statutes on the books focused on the
control, distribution, and disposal of hazardous waste and granted little
remedial power to the government to clean up the sites.1" CERCLA
rectified this problem by giving the government the authority and funds
6. See Leslie Cheek III, David Graham & Karen Wardzinski, Insurance Coverage for
Superfund Disputes: The Need for A Nonlitigation Approach, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,203 (1989).
The costs of litigating disputes between the insured parties and insurance companies has
reached astronomical levels, where the parties could be "[s]pending $30 million to $50 million
per site on cleanup and half again as much on litigation," therefore, the total cost of litigating
and cleaning of "15,000 sites could cost anywhere from $675 billion to more than a trillion
dollars!" Id. at 10,204.
7. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)
[hereinafter CERCLA].
8. JAN PAUL ACTON, UNDERSTANDING SUPERFUND: A PROGRESS REPORT v (1989).
9. The expanding public awareness of environmental issues is attributed to three major
events. Mitchell L. Lathrop, Environmental and Toxic Tort Claims from the Insurer's
Perspective, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND TOXIC TORT CLAIMS: INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 1989
AND BEYOND at 2 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course & Book Series No. A4-260, May
1, 1989). The first event was the publication of Rachel Carson's epic work The Silent Spring,
which raised awareness about the dangerous use of pesticides and herbicides. Id. The second
event was the explosion of an offshore oil well that threw thousands of gallons of oil onto the
beaches of Santa Barbara and Carpinteria. Id. The third major event was the infamous Love
Canal site where local schools and homes were built on a site only to find that a chemical
company buried drums of hazardous wastes in the ground. i
10. In 1969, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act that created the
EPA and established a national policy regarding environmental problems. Lathrop, supra note
9, at 3. A few years later, Congress passed the more comprehensive Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976. Id. The statute was concerned primarily with preventing parties
from contaminating land by creating standards and regulations for disposing of hazardous
waste. Id. The statute enforced the regulations with both civil and criminal liability on any
party failing to comply with those standards. Id.
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to identify and clean hazardous waste sites. In addition, CERCLA gave
the government the authority to force particular parties to clean the
contaminated site.
The purpose of this Comment is to explain and analyze the practical
effects of the City of Edgerton decision. Part II provides a general
overview of the procedures and administration of the liability scheme
under the CERCLA statute and includes a discussion of how government
agencies notify parties of potential environmental liabilities. The
notification process serves an important function in understanding the
court's interpretation of the insurance policy in the City of Edgerton
case. Part III provides a brief discussion of the role of insurance
companies and how they are associated with the environmental actions.
This part also provides a general discussion of the debate between the
insurance company and the insured parties on how the court should
interpret the insurance policies. Part IV discusses the City of Edgerton
case and how the court resolved the debate. Part V discusses the
practical effect of the decision and how the courts have applied it to
other fact patterns. Finally, Part VI provides a summary and conclusion
to the Comment.
II. OVERVIEW OF CERCLA
CERCLA, commonly known as Superfund, is essentially designed to
accommodate two forms of site cleanups. 2 The emergency response
component of the act grants the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") 3 the authority and money to respond to immediate hazards
that threaten human health or substantially impair the environment. 4
The second and more common form of site cleanup is the remediation
component. 5 This component focuses on the long term restoration of
sites that do not pose an immediate or direct threat to the health of the
people residing near the site.16
11. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
12. ACTON, supra note 8, at v.
13. Congress actually gave the President of the United States the authority to respond
to emergency situations. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1994). The President then granted this authority
to the EPA under Exec. Order No. 12,316, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (1981).
14. ACTON, supra note 8, at v. According to a study conducted in 1989, the EPA has
provided more than six million dollars worth of emergency response assistance to over 30 sites
in the state of Wisconsin. KENDRA BONDERUD, CONTAMINATED LAND CLEANUP PROGRAMS
3 (1995) (Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau Series No. 60, 1995).




CERCLA established a unique system of liability that continues to
be the most controversial aspect of the statute.17 Congress realized that
many cleanup projects would require unprecedented levels of money to
rectify the problem. Therefore, it created a tort-like liability scheme to
finance the projects. 8 This system applies the principles of strict
liability, 9 joint and several liability,0 and retroactive liability2" to
broad classes of parties that were associated with the property in some
manner.' The goal of Congress in creating this liability scheme is
remarkably similar to my mother's goal after seeing my brother and I
knock over one of her house plants while wrestling in the living room:
she did not care who created the mess, how it was created, or who was
primarily responsible for the accident; she just wanted the mess cleaned
up.2-
The liability scheme under CERCLA is a labyrinth of rules and
regulations that leave even the most experienced environmental lawyer
in unsurveyed territory. However, the basic process can be broken down
into a series of general, if not oversimplified, stages that map the way
through the restoration process. The initial stages primarily consist of
the EPA assessing the existence and extent of pollution on the land.
The second stages focus on the development of the most efficient and
inexpensive way to actually clean the contaminated site.
17. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
18. AarON, supra note 8, at vi.
19. Strict liability is the concept of "liability without fault." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1422 (6th ed. 1990). The doctrine is based on the idea that the party can still be liable for
injuries or damages regardless of the level of care, or lack thereof, exercised by the party. Al.
In the environmental context, a party can be liable for the costs associated with cleaning a
contaminated property if they were associated with the land or hazardous substance in the
past. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
20. Joint liability is the concept that two or more parties can share liability to a third
party. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 838 (6th ed. 1990). Several liability, on the other hand,
is the concept that one action can be brought against two or more parties separately, or
against both of them together. Id. at 1374.
21. Retroactive liability involves applying current liability to past events, even if the
event occurred in the distant past. Id. at 1317.
22. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
23. See Environmental Protection Agency, Superfund Enforcement Strategy and
Implementation Plan, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. 35,207 (1989). The report sets forth the EPA's
policies and principles in enforcing CERCLA. The report states in relevant part that "parties
may be liable under CERCLA without having violated any regulatory statutes. Thus, the
primary purpose of the liability scheme is to compel cleanup." Id. at 35,209.
[Vol. 80:853
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A. Assessing Damage on the Property
Obviously, the first step of any remediation program is to identify
contaminated, or potentially contaminated, sites.24 The EPA discovers
potentially contaminated sites through citizen complaints, state govern-
ment nominations,' and statutory reporting obligations.2 6 The report-
ing obligation arises under section 9603 which requires that all parties
handling toxic waste record and report their activities' This require-
ment is a residual provision from the first generation of environmental
statutes which focused on preventing and deterring environmental
contamination." However, the current generation of environmental
statutes provide stronger enforcement provisions than its predecessor by
creating both civil and criminal liability for parties failing to report such
activities.29
Once a potentially hazardous site is identified, the EPA conducts a
preliminary site assessment to determine the extent and severity of the
damage." The EPA regional office assigns an on-scene coordinator
("OSC") to conduct the initial investigation, called a preliminary
assessment?' This investigation is a "paper exercise" in which the OSC
examines technical documents to determine the probability that the
property was ever exposed to hazardous chemicals.3 2 The preliminary
assessment is conducted within the four walls of the EPA offices and
does not include a physical inspection of the property3 For instance,
the OSC may look to the owner's previous activities to see if he had
engaged in a business that used hazardous substances.
After the investigation, if the OSC believes the site may have been
exposed to hazardous substances, the EPA will conduct a formal site
24. ACTON, supra note 8, at 11.
25. The state nominates particular sites on the basis of groundwater tests. See id at 11.
26. Id. at 11.
27. Essentially, the CERCLA statute imposes a duty.upon any party associated with
hazardous waste to notify the EPA of any releases, transport, or storage of waste. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9603 (1994). In addition, the parties have to keep strict records of their activities, which can
be summoned by the EPA at any time. Id.
28. See Lathrop, supra note 9, at 3.
29. Criminal liability for a failure to report is created under section 9603(b). 42 U.S.C.
§ 9603(b) (1994). Civil liability for the costs associated with the clean up is under section 9607.
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
30. ACTON, supra note 8, at 11.
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inspection on the property.' The formal site inspection determines the
extent of the problem through a physical examination of the waste
characteristics of any suspected chemicals on the land, the proximity of
the lot to occupied housing and other improved lots, and the potential
water sources or disposal pathways that could provide the chemicals a
passage to adjoining properties. 35
The results of the site inspection allow the EPA to numerically rank
the contaminated lot according to a scale called the "hazard-ranking."36
This ranking represents the EPA's assessment of the potential danger the
site poses to the surrounding community.37  The hazard-ranking
quantitatively determines whether the EPA will institute any further
action to clean the contaminated site. If the ranking is sufficiently
high,38 the site will go on the dreaded National Priorities List ("NPL"). 39
Placement on the NPL marks the end of the initial investigatory stage
and sets the remediation process in motion. Once the property is listed
on the NPL, the EPA is at the point of no return and it must pursue
some action to clean the contaminated land.
Although the EPA provides a formal, and somewhat stoic, procedure
to implement cleanup,' in reality the process intermingles many of the
34. See AcTON, supra note 8, at 12.
35. Id at 28.
36. Id at 12. According to the Wisconsin Legislative Bureau, the hazard ranking for a
particular site is decided on six criteria: "(1) population at risk; (2) the hazardous potential of
the substances; (3) the potential for contamination of drinking water supplies; (4) the potential
for direct human contact; (5) the potential for destruction of sensitive ecosystems; and (6)
other appropriate factors." BONDERUD, supra note 15, at 3-4, 29.
37. ACTON, supra note 8, at 12.
38. According to the EPA ranking system, a numerical value of 28.5 or above will
qualify the site for a listing on the National Priorities List. LIGHT, supra note 31, at 40. Some
commentators believe this value will be decreased in the future to increase the number of
properties that are subject to CERCLA. ACTON, supra note 8, at 12.
39. The only good thing about being placed on the NPL is that it qualifies the site for
federal funds to clean up the mess. LIGHT, supra note 31, at 40. However, this is a dubious
advantage to the PRPs because they will be liable for the costs regardless of who initially pays
for the cleanup.
The EPA considers a listing on the NPL to be a rule-making function under the
Administrative Procedure Act and, therefore, gives the PRP an opportunity to comment on
the proposed listing. Id at 42 (citing 55 Fed. Reg. 51,532 (1990) (providing the latest EPA
revision to listing procedures)). However, the hearing is of relatively little value to the PRPs
since the EPA is unlikely to remove their name from the proposed list. Id The PRPs get a
second chance once they are placed on the NPL and assigned a portion of the costs. Id At
this point, they can bring a claim against the agency before the EPA Administrator. Id. (citing
40 CFR § 305.3 (1995)).
40. The EPA created a ten-step process to enforce CERCLA and fulfill the agency's
goal of eliciting a private party response to the contamination. The ten steps are:
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formal steps to fit the needs of the particular case. The one constant
that remains in any particular clean up program is the immediate search
for parties who will pay for the restoration process. 41  Once the
property is listed on the NPL, the EPA tries to track any person or
entity that has ever been associated with the property or hazardous
substance on the land.42 These parties are called potentially responsible
parties.43
B. The Remediation Process
The severity of the contamination and availability of PRPs dictates
how the remediation process will begin. If the contamination poses a
direct threat to the surrounding community, the EPA will begin the
1. Identification of Potentially Responsible Parties,
2. Information Exchange and Notification,
3. Removal Enforcement,
4. Private Party Remedial Investigations and Feasibility Studies,
5. Negotiations,
6. Settlement Authorities,
7. Unilateral Enforcement Authorities,
8. Administrative Records,
9. Oversight and Compliance, and
10. Cost Recovery.
Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 23, at 35,211.
41. The EPA's own search manual for PRPs states in relevant part that the "PRP search
should be concurrent with the initiation of the National Priorities List (NPL) listing process."
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE,
POTENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE PARTY SEARCH MANUAL FINAL REPORT 2 (1987) [hereinafter
OSWER].
42. JAN PAUL ACrON, SUPERFUND AND TRANSACTION COSTS, THE EXPERIENCE OF
VERY LARGE INDUSTRIAL FIRMS 3 (1992).
43. Title 42, section 9607(a) defines a PRP as:
1. the owner or operator of a vessel or facility [from which there is a release or
threatened release of any hazardous substance];
2. any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
3. any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for the disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
4. any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for the transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of
response costs, of a hazardous substance ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
1997]
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remediation process immediately.' CERCLA authorizes the EPA to
act in these emergency situations in what is called a fund lead.45 Under
a fund lead, the EPA initiates the cleanup process by taking money out
of a government trust fund.' Once the site is sufficiently cleaned, the
EPA locates all available PRPs to replenish the trust fund for any money
spent on the cleanup program.
However, if the land does not require immediate attention, the
remediation process begins with more intensive studies47 of the property
to evaluate all possible remediation programs.4s Under these circum-
stances, the EPA will shift the costs of the cleanup to all available
PRPs.49 The ultimate goal of this program (called a PRP lead) is to get
the PRPs involved at an early stage in the hope that they will voluntarily
work out a settlement agreement to pay the remediation costs.5" In the
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1994). The section states in relevant part:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat
into the environment, or (B) there is a release or substantial threat of release into
the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent
and substantial danger to public health and welfare, the President is authorized to
act... or take any other response measure consistent with the national contingency
plan.
Id.
45. ACTON, supra note 8, at 13.
46. The trust fund, established under 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1994), finances both the
preliminary investigation costs and any emergency costs that the EPA incurs to implement the
remediation process. ACTON, supra note 8, at 8. Congress initially authorized a total of $1.6
billion for the fund and increased the amount in 1986 under SARA to $8.5 million until 1991.
Id (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (Supp. 1986)). In 1991, the agency was given an
additional 5.1 million to replenish the fund until 1994. Id. However, Congress did not
replenish the fund in 1994. Id. The money for the fund is raised primarily through "taxes on
crude oil and chemical feedstocks, cost recoveries from site operators, generators and current
and past owners, interest, and general revenues." BONDERUD, supra note 14, at 6.
Wisconsin has an equivalent fund called the Environmental Repair Fund (ERF). Wis.
STAT. § 144.442 (1984). The ERF had a balance of $3.7 million in 1989. ENvrL. PROTEcTION
AGENCY, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY 158 (1989). The
ERF receives appropriations from the state ($4.2 million in 1989) and it receives more than
$1 million annually from "cost recovery actions and interest." Id.
47. The studies are called "formal investigations" and "feasibility studies." AarON,
supra note 8, at 13. Although there are differences between the two studies, it is sufficient for
purposes of this comment to describe both studies as an intensive investigation of the site and
waste characteristics to determine the possible remedies and the costs of those remedies.
48. ACrON, supra note 8, at 13.
49. Id. at 13.
50. See Envtl. Protection Agency, supra note 23, at 35,211 ("The goal of the government
is to negotiate an agreement for 100% of response costs."); Environmental Protection Agency
Superfund Program; Notice Letters, Negotiations and Information Exchange, 53 Fed. Reg.
5298,5298 (1988) ("A fundamental goal of the CERCLA enforcement program is to facilitate
voluntary settlements.").
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event the parties can not settle on the proper manner to distribute the
costs, the EPA is authorized to seek an injunctive order demanding that
the PRPs clean the land and apportion the cost later.5'
After the PRPs take the lead on the project, they are responsible for
developing a design plan to commence the clean up process.5 2 Once all
the proposals are in place, the EPA authorizes the most feasible plan in
a document called the record of decision 3 At this point the plan is put
into action and the contractors start the restoration.' If the plan is
successful, the PRPs can apply to the EPA to take the site off the NPL
and conclude the entire matter.55
C. Notifying the Potentially Responsible Parties
As mentioned, the hallmark of any cleanup program is the search for
potentially responsible parties." Accordingly, the identification process
runs concurrently with the property's listing on the NPL to illicit the
quickest possible response from the PRPs' The initial, and most
important, notification to the PRPs is called a general notice letter."
The purpose of the general notice letter is "to inform PRP's of their
potential liability for future response costs,"59 and to fulfill the EPA's
goal of establishing "the process of information exchange.., to initiate
51. See 42 U.S.C § 9006(a) (1994). This section states in relevant part:
When the President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial
danger to the public health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or
threatened release of a hazardous substance from the facility, he may require the
Attorney General of the Unites States to secure such relief as may be necessary to
abate such danger or threat and the district court of the United States in the district
in which the threat occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the public
interest and the equities of the case may require.
Id.
52. AcrON, supra note 8, at 13.
53. Id
54. L
55. Id. at 14.
56. The EPA's PRP Search Manual Final Report states in relevant part: "[t]he
identification of PRPs is an integral component in the resolution of a hazardous substance
release. From the notification of a release through the remedial action, identification of and
communication with the PRPs are essential in determining the strategy for cleanup."
OSWER, supra note 41, at 5.
57. Id.
58. The EPA sends general notice letters to "all parties where there is sufficient evidence
to make a preliminary determination of potential liability under section 107 of CERCLA."
Envtl. Protection Agency Superfund Program: Notice Letters, Negotiations and Information
Exchange, 53 Fed. Reg. 5298, 5301 (1988).
59. It at 5300.
1997]
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the process of informal negotiations. ' 6°
After the PRP receives a general notice letter, it can respond to the
letter in one of four ways: 1) voluntarily negotiate with other PRPs and
sign a consent decree;6' 2) directly negotiate with the EPA to settle the
PRP's liability; 3) seek immediate assistance from its insurer; or 4) simply
ignore the letter.62 If the PRP ignores the general notice letter, the
EPA is forced to seek injunctive relief to compel the party to clean the
site.6
When identifying PRPs, the EPA does not have an obligation to
name every party that could be liable for the contamination or to
apportion liabilities to the parties it does name.64 Each PRP is jointly
and severally liable for the entire cost of the cleanup.6' Therefore, the
usual "result is that a party with a 'deep pocket' that contributed only a
small amount of waste to a site to which other generators contributed,
theoretically, could find itself liable for the entire cost of the cleanup." 66
III. FRAMING THE ISSUE: INTERPRETING THE INSURER'S DUTY TO
DEFEND
A. The Insurance Company's Role
The PRPs usually look to their insurers to help carry the immense
financial burden imposed by the CERCLA statute.67 The insurer is
generally involved in the clean up process through a comprehensive
general liability policy (CGL). The CGL does not specifically cover a
particular injury, but "indemnifies the insured against a virtually
unlimited variety of events causing bodily injury or property damage
60. Id. In addition to theses purposes, the general notice also informs the PRPs of the
special notice procedures and the time constraints for a response. Id.
61. The EPA always prefers that the parties settle the matter without the agency's direct
involvement. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 23, at 35,209. As stated in one
of its formal policy guides, "the EPA will consider private party responses as the preferred
approach for the majority of the Superfund Sites." Id.
62. Sidney S. Liebesman, Triggering An Obligation: Receipt of an EPA PRP Letter and
An Insurer's Duty to Defend, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 479, 489 (1994).
63. Id
64. Lathrop, supra note 9, at 6.
65. See supra notes 20 and accompanying text.
66. Lathrop, supra note 9, at 8.
67. See Barry R. Ostrager, Special Insurance Coverage Issues Arising out of Hazardous
Waste/Environmental Clean-up Litigation, 855 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1005 (1993). Ostrager states that
"insurers frequently receive requests from insureds for reimbursements of expenses incurred
to investigate and remediate toxic waste problems." l at 1049.
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unless specifically excluded from coverage." '' The form and interpreta-
tion of this policy has substantially changed over the years,69 and each
change has expanded the scope of the policy to create broader environ-
mental liability for the insurer."
The ordinary CGL will contain a "duty to defend" clause that defines
the time and event (or events) that will trigger the insurer's liability."
This clause usually states that the insurer has the "duty to defend any
suit against the insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury
or property damage."'72 The controversy in an ordinary coverage
lawsuit arises from the interpretation of the words "suit" and "damages."
Specifically, the issue is whether a general notice letter from the EPA
constitutes a "suit" within the CGL and whether PRPs' cleanup costs73
constitute "damages" within the CGL.
B. Interpreting "Suit" Under the CGL
The insurer favors a narrow construction of the words, limiting the
68. Thomas A. Gordon & Roger Westendorf, Liability Coverage For Toxic Tort,
Hazardous Waste Disposal And Other Pollution Exposures, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 567, 574-75
(1988).
69. The CGL policy used to be triggered on an "accident" basis where liability depended
on a "sudden, catastrophic event." Irene A. Sullivan & William J. Wright Jr., Hazardous
Waste, Toxic Tort, and Product Liability Insurance Problems 1987 in HAZARDOUS WASTE
LITIGATION: CGL INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES 301 (1987). The policies were revised in
1966 to provide coverage on an "occurrence" basis. Id. This change expanded the scope of
liability for the insurer because an "occurrence" meant "an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury or
property damage." Id.
70. See Gordon & Westendorf, supra note 68, at 575.
71. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW, AN
ANALYSIS OF TOXIC AND HAZARDOUS WASTE INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES 43 (1991).
72. The total provision for a general comprehensive liability policy in Wisconsin states:
The company [insurer] will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of... bodily injury
or ... property damage ... caused by an occurrence, and the company shall have the
right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of
such bodily injury or property damage.
ARNOLD P. ANDERSON, WISCONSIN INSURANCE LAW 406 (Michael S. Gilleland ed., 3d ed.
1990).
73. Not all expenses associated with a contaminated parcel of property constitute
"response costs" under CERCLA. See ABRAHAM, supra note 71, at 11. CERCLA imposes
strict liability for "the necessary costs of 'response,"' and defines "response" as "remove,
removal, remedy, and remedial action." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1994)). Therefore,
"response costs" are the expenses paid by the PRP for "the retention of environmental
consultants, the formulation of remedial action plans and the implementation of those plans."
Ostrager, supra note 54, at 1049-50.
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definitions to the literal meaning of the policy language.74 To the
insurer, the general notice letter does not constitute a "suit" under the
CGL because it only informs PRPs of their potential liability for a
contaminated site.7' The insurer defines "suit" as a formal legal action
in a court of law, not as an informal notification of possible liability.7
6
The PRPs define the word in a broad manner to trigger the duty to
defend clause in the CGL.77 The PRPs argue that the word "suit" is
ambiguous in the CGL policy and, therefore, should be construed in
favor of coverage. 8 In addition, the PRPs argue that the insurer's
narrow interpretation frustrates the reasonable expectations of the
parties at the time the contract was formed.79 The PRPs view the
general notice letter as something more than just a notification of
potential liability and argue that it actually embodies the same character-
istics as a traditional lawsuit because it immediately affects the PRPs'
rights.'° In other words, a general notice letter has the effect of a lawsuit
because it presents the insured with a number of choices that will
significantly determine the ultimate cost of the cleanup and who will
bear that cost.8"
74. See Joanna L. Johnson, Whether Insurers Must Defend PRP Notification: An
Expensive Issue Complicated By Conflicting Court Decisions, N.ILL. U.L. REV., 579, 592
(1990).
75. i at 593. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
76. Johnson, supra note 74, at 593. See also Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. v. Marois, 573
A2d 16, 16 (Me. 1990) ("[T]he duty to defend the insured party against 'any suit.., seeking
damages' does not include an administrative proceeding that can award no damages.").
77. Johnson, supra note 74, at 593.
78. let
79. Paul V. Majkowski, Triggering the Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend in Environmen-
tal Proceedings: Does A Potentially Responsible Party Notification Constitute a "Suit"?, 67 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 383, 386 (1993). Mr. Majkowski states "pro-insured results are often ob-
tained through ... the reasonable expectations doctrine." Id. He goes on to say that "[t]he
reasonable expectations tests similarly reflects surrounding circumstances by defining the policy
language as that which one in the insured's position would reasonably have expected it to
mean." Id.
80. lt; see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1516-17 (9th Cir.
1991) (concluding that the general notice letter is "unlike the garden variety demand letter").
In a federal CERCLA action, PRPs are required to sign a consent decree when they volun-
tarily agree to settle the matter. Arthur J. Harrington & Thomas N. Harrington, Harrington
v. Harrington: Two Advocates Square Off on the Edgerton Decision, ENVTL. L. SECTION
M.B.A. 2 (1994). The decree is accompanied by the filing of a Summons and Complaint and
is not effective until it is published in the Federal Register. Id. PRPs argue these formal
requirements justify the position that a reasonable person would construe a general notice
letter as an agency action that constitutes a "suit." See supra note 79.
81. See Liebesman, supra note 49, at 489. See also Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Cello-O
Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 74 (E.D. Mich. 1987) ("The insurers construe their policies too
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C. Interpretation of Damages
The insurers have a similarly narrow interpretation of the word
"damages" that relies on a highly technical distinction between the
classification of legal and equitable damages.' The argument starts
with the premise that response costs are classified as equitable remedies
designed to "restore the status quo ante or prevent threatened future
injury."'  The insurer argues that the CGL policies only contemplate
legal remedies which are designed to compensate for past injuries. 4
They believe that the two remedies must remain separate or the phrase
"pay as damages" will lose all practical value in limiting the insurer's
exposure.85
The PRPs, however, interpret the term in a different manner. The
PRPs consider the term in the CGL to be ambiguous because it could
mean legal or equitable damages.86 The PRPs rely on the common law
contract rule that the court must interpret any ambiguous terms in the
contract under their plain meaningY The insureds argue that reason-
able people understand the plain meaning of the term "damages" to
encompass any costs incurred as a result of an environmental contamina-
tion.8 Therefore, in the eyes of the PRPs, a broad definition not only
encompasses the plain meaning of the word, it also enforces the original
expectations of the parties when the policy was created.
IV. CITY OF EDGERTON V. GENERAL CASUALTY Co. 89
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recently silenced the debate on
narrowly: coverage does not hinge on the form of the action taken or the nature of relief
sought, but on an actual or threatened use of legal process to coerce payment or conduct by
a policyholder."); Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Commercial Union Co., 697 F. Supp. 1314, 1322
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("It should be clear that it is misleading to characterize a demand letter.., as
seeking 'voluntary participation in remedial measures."').
82. Kristen A. Kolesar, Note, Insurance Coverage for CERCLA Claims Under
Comprehensive General Liability Policies: Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste in the Legal
Environment, NOTRE DAME L. REV. 549, 553 n.19 (1993).
83. Johnson, supra note 74, at 593 n.88 (citing BARRY OSTRAGER & T. NEvMAN,
HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 8.03 (2d ed. 1989)).
84. Bruce W. Roznowski, The Insurance Industry Perspective: Unique Coverage Issues,
in ENVIRONMENTAL AND TOXIC TORT CLAIMS: INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 1989 AND
BEYOND 8 (1989).
85. Id.
86. See Johnson, supra note 74, at 596-97.
87. Kolesar, supra note 82, at 554.
88. ld. at 553 n.18.
89. 184 Wis. 2d 750, 517 N.W.2d 463 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995).
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the proper interpretation of these terms in City of Edgerton v. General
Casualty Co.9" In one swift blow, the court reversed a pro-insured legal
trend in Wisconsin and created an immensely popular forum for
insurance companies trying to avoid environmental liability under the
duty to defend clauses.9
A. Overview of the Case
The case involved a landfill in Rock County that was owned and
operated by Edgerton Sand & Gravel, Inc. ("ES&G").92 The site was
primarily used as a place for dumping and burning waste.93 ES&G
operated the property as a municipal landfill under a lease with the City
of Edgerton (the "City").94 In 1978, the EPA suspected groundwater
contamination at the site and recommended that the site be closed and
capped.95 ES&G closed the landfill, but the water contamination
problem persisted.96 Consequently, the Wisconsin Department of
Natural Resources (the "DNR")97 recommended that the site be placed
90. l., 517 N.W.2d at 463.
91. Robert Mullins, Pushing the Edgerton Envelope: Insurers Edgy After Ruling, BUS.
J.-MILWAUKEE, July 23, 1994, at 2 (quoting Timothy Jablonski, branch manager of insurance
broker Johnson & Higgins, as saying Wisconsin went from "being the worst state to be an
insurance company in, as far as environmental issues, to being the best state."). Prior to the
City of Edgerton decision, Wisconsin was a preferable forum for insured parties because it
allowed the parties to avoid pollution exclusion clauses in CGL policies. See Just v. Land
Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis. 2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570 (1990). Pollution exclusion clauses
exempt the insurer from covering all occurrences that are not "sudden and accidental" releases
of pollution on the property. Id. at 741,456 N.W.2d at 572. In Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd.,
the court interpreted the "sudden and accidental" language very broadly and allowed gradual
polluters to recover from the insurance companies under the CGL policies. I& at 760, 456
N.W.2d at 578.
92. City of Edgerton, 184 Wis. 2d at 758-59, 517 N.W.2d at 468.
93. Id., 517 N.W.2d at 468.
94. Id., 517 N.W.2d at 468.
95. Capping was a process where the EPA places a layer of clay under the topsoil of the
contaminated property to contain the hazardous wastes. Id. at 759 n.6, 517 N.W.2d at 468 n.6.
96. Id. at 759, 517 N.W.2d at 468.
97. Although CERCLA is a federal statute, waste cleanups are actually regulated under
both federal and state law. See generally WIS. STAT. §§ 144.442, 144.76 (1987). The Wisconsin
statutes mirror the liability system developed under CERCLA by creating a ranking system
and a fund for emergency situations. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AN ANALYSIS
OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50 STATE STUDY, 1990 UPDATE 170 (1990). The DNR
is the primary enforcement agency in Wisconsin and is "responsible for implementation of the
state's direct response hazardous substances cleanup programs and is authorized to take action
to take actions to implement the federal programs in cooperation with the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA)." BONDERUD, supra note 14, at 1.
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on the EPA's list of contaminated sites for priority cleanup."
On June 22, 1989, the DNR notified ES&G and the City that it was
investigating the circumstances surrounding the presence of hazardous
waste on the property.99 Each party immediately informed its insurer,
General Casualty Company, and requested payment for any expenses
resulting from the investigation."° General Casualty Company did not
respond to the request.'0' In February of 1990, the DNR sent a special
notification letter giving each party the option to voluntarily agree to a
remediation arrangement or have the EPA place the site on the National
Priorities List."°  Again, the parties notified their insurers of the
impending liability and General Casualty Company failed to respond on
the basis that the EPA did not constitute a "suit for damages."'"
The City and ES&G commenced a declaratory action to define the
obligations of the insurance company under the CGL policy."1 4 The
plaintiffs alleged that General Casualty was obligated to defend the
parties in the administrative process and indemnify the parties for any
loses sustained as a result of the contamination." The trial court
agreed with the plaintiffs on the basis that the general liability letter
constituted a "suit" under the CGL.' 6
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that the initial
general notice letter did not trigger the insurer's duty to defend."
However, the court of appeals ruled that General Casualty was still
obligated to defend the action because the subsequent special notice
letters triggered the duty to defend." s The court of appeals held that
the special notice letters created a certain level of "adversariness"
between the parties because the letter gave the insured parties an
98. City of Edgerton, 184 Wis. 2d at 760-61, 517 N.W.2d at 469. The list for priority
clean up is not the same list as the National Priorities List. The list for priority clean up is the
initial notification that the DNR is beginning an analysis of the property, which could
eventually lead to a place on the NPL.
99. Id. at 759-60, 517 N.W.2d at 468.
100. lId at 760, 517 N.W.2d at 468-69.
101. lId, 517 N.W.2d at 468-69.
102. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
103. City of Edgerton, 184 Wis. 2d at 758-62, 517 N.W.2d at 468-69.
104. Id., 517 N.W.2d at 468-69.
105. Id., 517 N.W.2d at 468-69.
106. City of Edgerton v. General Cas. Co., 172 Wis. 2d 518, 528, 493 N.W.2d 768, 772
(Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
107. Id. at 534, 493 N.W.2d at 775.
108. Id., 493 N.W.2d at 775 ("We conclude that the duty to defend arises when a federal
or state environmental agency identifies a PRP which it unequivocally requires to pay the cost
of, or participate in paying the cost of, landfill remediation and cleanup.").
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ultimatum: voluntarily settle on a remediation agreement or the EPA
will force you to settle by putting the property on the NPL. °9
In addition, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals ruled that remediation
costs are included as "damages" under the CGL policy."' The court
of appeals was not convinced by the technical distinctions between legal
and equitable damages and concluded that the response costs contem-
plate both past and future injuries."' The court of appeals held that
the "insured ought to be able to rely on the common sense expectations
that the property damages within the meaning of the policy includes a
claim... causing him to pay sums of money because of his acts or
omissions. '
B. The City of Edgerton Result-Creating a Friendlier Forum for
Insurance Companies
The Wisconsin Supreme Court precluded coverage on both counts by
adopting a narrow definition of the terms "suit" and "damages." In
defining the word "suit," the court agreed with the court of appeals that
the general notice letter did not trigger the duty to defend the insured
PRP." However, the court went one step further and ruled that the
special notice letter was not encompassed within the definition ei-
ther. 14
The court defined a "suit" as an action requiring an "actual court
proceeding, initiated by the filing of a complaint." ''1 The court
determined that neither the general nor special notice letters had any
functional importance beyond making the parties aware of their potential
liabilities.11 6 The letters were not confrontational tools that forced the
parties to engage in some remedial action on the site, but only served to
109. The appellate court relied on the case Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., which listed
certain factors that determined whether a notice letter constituted a "suit." Ryan v. Royal Ins.
Co. of Am., 916 F.2d 731, 741 (Ist Cir. 1990). These factors are the "coerciveness, adversar-
iness, [and] the seriousness of the effort with which the government hounds an insured, and
the gravity of the imminent consequences." Id The Wisconsin Court of Appeals concluded
that the DNR had taken a sufficient "adversarial posture" to make the special purpose letter
a "suit" under this analysis. City of Edgerton, 172 Wis. 2d at 539, 493 N.W.2d at 776.
110. City of Edgerton, 172 Wis. 2d at 543, 493 N.W.2d at 778.
111. Id, 493 N.W.2d at 778.
112. Id, 493 N.W.2d at 778 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 768 F. Supp.
1186, 1199-1200 (W.D. Mich. 1990)).
113. City of Edgerton v. General Cas. Co., 184 Wis. 2d 750, 758, 517 N.W.2d 463, 468
(1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995).
114. Id, 517 N.W.2d at 468.
115. Id at 774, 517 N.W.2d at 474.
116. Id, 517 N.W.2d at 474.
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"gather information regarding hazardous substances at the site, as well
as to call for voluntary action by the City and ES&G in the process of
cleanup.""M7
The court relied on Detrex Chemical Industries v. Employers
Insurance of Wausau"' to support its narrow definition."9 In Detrex
Chemical Industries, the Detrex Corporation ("Detrex") brought an
action for declaratory judgment against the insurer, Employers Insurance
of Wausau, to establish the rights of the respective parties.Y Detrex
was liable for six different properties throughout the country that were
listed on the NPL and it sought coverage under its standard CGL
policy.121
The court concluded that the environmental action did not rise to the
level of a "suit" in the CGL policy." Initially, it looked to the four
comers of the policy and discovered that the word "suit" was listed
separately from the word "claim" in the contract." 3 The court then
looked to the plain meaning of the word and determined that it required
some action beyond the mere assertion of a claim against the insured
PRPe
124
The City of Edgerton court picked up on this distinction and ruled
that "neither letter has the attributes of a suit.""n  The court also
focused on the inherent unfairness of holding the insurance companies
to a broad interpretation of the word "suit." Under Wisconsin law, one
of the primary goals in interpreting insurance policies is to enforce the
true intentions of the parties.Y The court determined that the
insurance company had never intended to bind itself to environmental
liabilities and, therefore, a broad construction would create an obligation
117. Id., 517 N.W.2d at 474.
118. 681 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
119. See City of Edgerton, 184 Wis. 2d at 774, 517 N.W.2d at 474.
120. Detrex Chemical Industries, 681 F. Supp. at 441.
121. ld. at 442. The policy contained the usual language that the insurer is obligated to
"defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or
property damage." Id.
122. ld at 443.
123. Id.
124. Id ("[A] claim for damages made against Detrex that might result in its legal
liability is not synonymous with a 'suit' and therefore the making of the claim is not enough
to trigger the duty to defend.").
125. City of Edgerton, 184 Wis. 2d at 774, 517 N.W.2d at 474.




the parties never intended."
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' definition of "damages" under
the CGL.'" The court determined that the remediation costs to clean
a contaminated site were equitable damages that fell outside the scope
of legal damages contemplated by the CGL policy."
The court adopted the narrow definition promulgated in Shorewood
School District v. Wausau Insurance Companies."3° In that case, the
Shorewood School District was sued by some schoolchildren and the
Board of the School District of. the City of Milwaukee for engaging in
illegal racial discrimination that resulted in an "inequality of educational
opportunity." '  The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive
relief to force the school districts to organize programs and procedures
that would reduce the occurrence of racial discrimination in the
future.13
2
The Shorewood School District immediately attempted to get its
insurance carrier, Wausau Insurance Companies, to defend the suit under
its CGL policy. The policy contained the language that the insurer
would "defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account
of such [personal injury]."133 The school district argued that, although
the complaint did not assert a direct claim for damages, the expenses
incurred in conforming to the court order constituted "damages" under
the CGL policy.34
The court disagreed with the school district and drew a sharp
distinction between legal and restitutionary damages. The court held
that insurance policies only included legal damages compensating parties
for "past wrongs or injuries" and not equitable remedies to prevent
future injuries.13 Once the court defined damages in this restrictive
manner, the rest of the decision progressed logically. Because the
127. City of Edgerton, 184 Wis. 2d at 781,517 N.W.2d at 477. ("[T]he insurer would be
put in the position of anticipating a coverage expectation for which it did not contract or
receive payment.").
128. Idt at 782, 517 N.W.2d at 477.
129. Id, 517 N.W.2d at 477.
130. 170 Wis. 2d 347, 488 N.W.2d 82 (Wis. 1992).
131. Shorewood School District, 170 Wis. 2d at 348, 488 N.W.2d at 85.
132. Id, 488 N.W.2d at 85.
133. Id., 488 N.W.2d at 85 (brackets in original).
134. Id at 365-66, 488 N.W.2d at 88.
135. The Shorewood court stated, "'[d]amages' as used in these insurance policies
unambiguously means legal damages. It is legal compensation for past wrongs or injuries and
is generally pecuniary in nature. The term 'damages' does not encompass the cost of
complying with an injunctive decree." Id. at 368, 488 N.W.2d at 89.
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plaintiffs only demanded equitable damages to prevent future discrimina-
tion and the school district's insurance policy only included the obligation
to defend legal damages, the insurer was not obligated to defend the
action.136
The Edgerton court applied this same reasoning in determining that
response costs were not included within the term "damages" in the CGL
policy. The court determined that the response costs were actually a
monetary form of compliance with the EPA's administrative injunction
to clean the land. 37 The City and ES&G demanded response costs,
however the court held that the costs were not included as "damages"
under the CGL policy.3
The court listed two additional reasons why response costs were not
included in the word damages. The first reason was that the phrase "as
damages" would lose all value if the term were interpreted broadly
because any expense would be encompassed by the definition. 9 The
second reason focused on Congressional intent and the structure of the
CERCLA statute. In the liability section of CERCLA, Congress holds
a potentially responsible party liable for "all costs of removal or remedial
action incurred by the United States Government or a State" or
"damages for injury to, destruction Of, or loss of natural resources.1''14
The court inferred that the separate classification of response costs and
natural resource damages meant that Congress intended the response
costs as equitable relief and the natural resource losses as compensatory
damages. 41
The court attempted to bolster its minority position142 by citing two
136. Id. at 374-75, 488 N.W.2d at 92.
137. City of Edgerton v. General Cas. Co., 184 Wis. 2d 750, 785, 517 N.W.2d 463, 478
(1994), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995).
138. lit, 517 N.W2d at 478.
139. lit at 784, 517 N.W.2d at 478 ("[T]his court has concluded that if the term
'damages' is given a broader or more expansive interpretation, the phrase 'as damages' would
be rendered mere surplusage, since any expenses prior to litigation would be covered by the
policies.").
140. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A), (a)(4)(C) (1994).
141. City of Edgerton, 184 Wis. 2d 784,517 N.W.2d at 478 ("Response costs ... are, by
definition, considered to be equitable relief and reflect a congressional intent to differentiate
between cleanup or response costs under 42 U.S.C. sec. 9607(a)(4)(A) and damages for injury,
destruction, or loss of natural resources under 42 U.S.C. sec. 9607(a)(4)(C).").
142. Krueger & Smith, supra note 2, at 4. (providing a survey of how other jurisdictions
have decided the "damages" issue). Of the twelve state supreme courts that have decided the
issue, only one jurisdiction agrees with the City of Edgerton interpretation. Id. That case is
Patrons Oxford Mutual Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16 (Me. 1990). In addition, eleven state
appellate courts and six circuit courts of appeal have decided that response costs are damages.
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federal cases that ruled similarly on the "damages" issue. The first was
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc.,143 a fourth circuit case in which
the defendant, Armco, was included on the list of potentially liable
parties for the contamination of a waste storage facility.'" The EPA
brought a suit against the parties seeking injunctive relief to force a
settlement between the listed PRPs. 45 Armco immediately contacted
its insurer, Maryland Casualty, and demanded to be compensated for any
expenses arising from the government action under its CGL policy."4
The primary issue in the case was whether the EPA's action seeking
injunctive relief constituted a claim for "damages" under the CGL. In
construing the term, the court determined that it should apply a "legal,
technical meaning" differentiating between legal and equitable damag-
es. 47 The court analyzed the relief demanded by the EPA and
concluded that the EPA was only seeking to "prevent or mitigate the
occurrences or reoccurrences of hazardous contamination"--or, in
essence, the EPA was seeking equitable damages."4 The court held
that the CGL policy only covered legal damages. 49  Therefore, the
court held that the EPA's action seeking injunctive relief did not
constitute a claim for "damages" under the CGL policy."5
The second case relied on in the City of Edgerton decision was
Continental Insurance v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical
Company, Inc.5' In that case, Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemi-
cal Company ("NEPACCO") was involved in the manufacturing industry
which produced hazardous waste as a byproduct of its business.' The
company disposed of the waste by placing it in storage drums and
Krueger & Smith, supra note 2, at 2.
143. 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987).
144. Id. at 1350.
145. Id.
146. The CGL obligated Maryland Casualty:
[T]o pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including
the loss of use thereof, caused by an occurrence; [and] [To] defend any suit against
the insured alleging such injury, sickness, disease or destruction and seeking damages
on account thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent ....
Id. at 1350.
147. Id. at 1351-52.
148. Id at 1354.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988).
152. Id at 979.
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burying the waste underground. 53 The drums subsequently leaked and
the company was faced with environmental liability under CERCLA 54
The EPA filed a lawsuit against the PRPs demanding that the parties
pay for the response costs." The EPA won the lawsuit and com-
menced a garnishment action against Continental Insurance Company as
NEPACCO's insurer.'56 Continental responded by filing an action for
declaratory judgment to define the respective rights of the parties.' 7
As in the Armco case, the primary issue was whether the government
action demanded relief in a form consistent with the definition of
damages under the CGL policy. The court held that the plain meaning
of the term "damages" only encompassed legal damages, not equitable
damages.lss The court followed the Armco decision and ruled that the
government claim constituted a claim for equitable damages which were
not covered under NEPACCO's CGL policy because the policy only
covered legal damages. 9
V. CRITIQUE OF THE CITY OF EDGERTON DECISION
The City of Edgerton decision created a wave of fear for many of the
municipalities and local business communities facing high liability
costs."6 What caused the most fear was the court's narrow interpreta-
tion of the word "damages." The decision unequivocally stated that
response costs were not "damages" under the CGL policy and, therefore,
the insurer will never have to pay those expenses even when the EPA
fies a formal lawsuit. 61
As of September 30, 1994, Wisconsin had forty sites listed on the




156. Id. at 981.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 985-87.
159. Ld. at 985.
160. A list of over 60 businesses and industries petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court
to reconsider its decision. Mullins, supra note 91. The article stated, "Some businesses and
municipalities now worry that their liability insurance policies are virtually worthless for this
type of liability, and fear they'll go bankrupt cleaning up environmental contamination on their
own." Id.
161. City of Edgerton v. General Cas. Co., 184 Wis. 2d 750, 782, 517 N.W.2d 463, 477
(1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995) ("The CGL policies in this case do not provide
coverage for Superfund response costs, since such costs do not constitute damages.").
162. BONDERUD, supra note 14, at 3.
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the EPA was in the process of evaluating an additional 300 sites in the
state that could potentially become Superfund projects in the future.' 6'
Of the forty sites listed on the NPL, twenty-nine projects were financed
by the PRPs.1 4  The cost of the current environmental projects in
Wisconsin was estimated at $215,000,000, of which local municipalities,
like the City of Edgerton, were responsible for approximately $92,-
760,000.1" The court's interpretation of the CGL policy assures that
all PRPs will not receive insurance coverage for their portion of the
$215,000,000 liability attributed to response costs.
This severe result raises the question of whether the court interpreted
the language in the duty to defend clause correctly. The decision is
susceptible to three major criticisms. The first criticism stems from the
court's interpretation of the word "suit." In defining the word in such
a narrow manner as an "actual court proceeding[-], initiated by the filing
of a complaint,"1" the court is motivating parties to prolong the
settlement process. 67 If the court requires a formal judicial proceeding
to trigger the duty to defend clause, the PRPs will not begin the
remediation process until that action is filed to avoid the risk that their
insurer will deny coverage under City of Edgerton. The net result is that
the PRPs will be motivated to ignore general notice letters, prolong
settlement negotiations, and wait for a formal judicial fling.
163. lat
164. Id.
165. See Tom Cioni, Landfill Cleanup Ruling Could Have Costly Implications for
Cedarburg, MILWAUKEE J., June 28, 1994, at 1. The article cites an informal survey conducted
by the League of Wisconsin Municipalities in which the League faxed questionnaires to 158
Wisconsin cities (the state has total of 189 cities). Memorandum from League of Wisconsin
Municipalities (June 28, 1994) (on file with author). The questionnaires asked the cities if any
of them were currently under orders from a government agency to investigate or cleanup any
landfill sites. Id. In addition, the questionnaire asked what the city's share of the total cost
was for inspection and remediation. d Of the 106 cities that responded to the question-
naires, 38 of those cities were either third parties in an environmental action or under orders
from a government agency to engage in a cleanup program. ld. The total cost of these
cleanup measures was $215,202,924. Id.
Another interesting aspect of the survey was a follow-up question that asked whether
the city believed it had insurance to cover these costs. Id. Twenty of the 38 cities believed
they had insurance coverage, 10 cities were not sure if they had insurance coverage, and 7
cities believed they did not have insurance. Id.
166. City of Edgerton v. General Cas. Co., 184 Wis. 2d 750, 775, 517 N.W.2d 463, 474
(1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995).
167. Harrington, supra note 80, at 2; Richard W. Fields & Priscilla Anne Whitehead,
Wisconsin's Summer Surprise: Life After Edgerton, 7 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 117 (Winter 1994/95).
168. Some commentators respond to this argument by stating that the PRPs will not wait
for the formal filing because it would compromise the client's other rights. See Heidi L. Vogt,
City of Edgerton v. General Casualty of Wisconsin: A Landmark Decision in Wisconsin
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The second major criticism is that the court's interpretation diverges
from precedent in Wisconsin and other jurisdictions that have decided
the issue. Under Wisconsin law, courts give unambiguous terms in
insurance policies a "plain and ordinary meaning."169 Most jurisdic-
tions that have decided the issue have determined that the plain and
ordinary meaning of "damages" does not include the hyper-technical
distinction between legal and equitable reliet" ° There is a strong
argument that most people would not construe the word damages in such
a technical sense and would believe that the response costs would be
encompassed within the definition. Therefore, the majority of jurisdic-
tions interpreting damages, unlike the court in City of Edgerton, seem to
enforce the meaning that the parties intended when they formed the
insurance policy. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that the
insurance industry itself attributed a broad, inclusive meaning to the term
damages within the standard CGL policy."
The third criticism of the decision is that the cases used to support
the court's interpretation of "damages" have been gutted of all
substantive value. In Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mutual Insurance
Co., the Maryland Court of Appeals rejected the Fourth Circuit's
analysis in Armco and ruled that response costs were not distinct from
legal damages." Similarly, in Independent Petrochemical Corp. v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,74 the District Court of Columbia rejected
Insurance Coverage Law, 68 Wis. LAW. May 1995 at 10, 12. Although this assertion is true,
the fact remains that if the PRP wants to recover a portion of the remediation costs (Le.,
natural resources damages), the PRP will have to wait for a formal filing to fall within the
parameters of the duty to defend clause.
169. Frank v. Wisconsin Mut. Life Ins., 543 N.W.2d 535, 536 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
170. Fields and Whitehead note that City of Edgerton stands contrary to "the great
majority of U.S. Courts of Appeals, Wisconsin federal district courts, and the unanimous panel
of Wisconsin Court of Appeals in the [Edgerton] decision." Fields & Whitehead, supra note
167, at 118. See also Ostrager supra note 67 (providing a synopsis of state cases interpreting
the definition of damages and suit).
171. See Jordan S. Stanzler & Charles A. Yuen, Coverage for Environmental Cleanup
Costs: History of the Word "Damages" in the Standard Form Comprehensive General Liability
Policy, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 449, 479, 457-487 (1990). Stanzler and Yuen state "the
insurance industry would have been surprised to hear the industry's current "damages"
arguments .... By the 1940s, the insurance industry was well aware that any substantive
distinction between "damages" and "injunctive relief" in actions to remedy the [environmental
contamination] had become insignificant." Id. at 479.
172. 625 A.2d 1021 (Md. 1993).
173. Id. at 1033 ("We do not think that the construction of the phrase 'pay as damages'
based on the ordinary meaning of the words improperly reduces the concept of damages to
mere surplusage.").
174. 944 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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the Northeastern Pharmaceutical decision stating "[w]e also reject the
insurers' argument, adopted in NEPACCO ... that the language of
CERCLA is against construing the word 'damages' to encompass liability
for the governments' cleanup costs." '175
These criticisms have, in part, lead to a movement in the Wisconsin
appellate courts to restrict the application of the decision to the facts of
the case. The court has not extended City of Edgerton to claims for
response costs by owners of property against insured parties that
contributed to the contamination. 76 Neither has the court extended
City of Edgerton to other clauses within the CGL policy'" (ie.,
umbrella policies). Thus, City of Edgerton stands only "for the
proposition that letters from an environmental agency do not constitute
a suit and that the agency's order to an owner or occupier of land to
remediate the land is nothing more than an order for injunctive relief
[which does not constitute damages]."' 8
VI. CONCLUSION
It has been three years since the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided
City of Edgerton. Although the case seemed to dramatically change
enviroumental law in Wisconsin, the true effect of the case seems rather
minimal. Many of the fears and apprehensions of business communities
and municipalities toward the court's narrow interpretation of "suit" and
"damages" have not been realized as a result of the court's willingness
to limit the application of the case. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
should limit the decision to the facts of the case because it prolongs the
settlement process, misconstrues the plain and ordinary interpretation of
175. Id. at 946-47.
176. See, e.g., General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin v. Hills, 201 Wis. 2d 1, 548 N.W.2d 100
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996); Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 200 Wis. 2d 821,
548 N.W.2d 544 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996); Spic & Span, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 203 Wis. 2d
118, 522 N.W.2d 435 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996); Sauk County v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 202
Wis. 2d 434, 550 N.W.2d 439 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
For example, in General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin v. Hills, the owner of a contaminated
waste disposal site sued one of the contributors as a third party defendant for response costs.
Hills, 201 Wis. 2d at 3-4, 548 N.W.2d at 101. The contributor filed a claim with its insurer and
the insurer denied coverage on the basis that response costs were not damages under the
CGL. Id., 548 N.W.2d at 101. The court held that the City of Edgerton did not apply to these
facts because the contributor did not own the property and the landowner's claim was seeking
monetary compensation, not injunctive relief. Id. at 13, 548 N.W.2d at 104.
177. General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin v. Getzen Co., 205 Wis. 2d 111, 555 N.W.2d 409
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
178. Hills, 201 Wis. 2d at 10, 548 N.W.2d at 103.
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the terms, and relies upon substantively questionable precedent. The
time has come to accept City of Edgerton for what it really is: a poorly
construed case subject to valid criticisms that should limit the decision to
the facts of the case.
WILLIAM T. STUART

